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Comment
Advertising for Adoption Placement: Gray Market
Activities in a Gray Area of Constitutional Protection
I.

INTRODUCTION

Adoption was not recognized at common law.' However, all
states now allow for adoption through statutes.2 This suggests that
a legal system providing nurturing homes for children is generally
recognized as beneficial and necessary. 3 Further support for the
proposition that a legal system providing nurturing homes is beneficial and necessary is found in the fact that, in the United States,
adoption statutes have consistently been intended to protect the
welfare of children, unlike Roman laws which served merely to prevent the extinction of family lines." The importance of adoption in
the United States is also illustrated by the fact that most adoption
statutes in the United States had been enacted by the first part of
the twentieth century, ahead of similar parliamentary action in
Great Britain.'
Adoption is the overall legal process by which a parent who is
not the natural parent of a child becomes legally recognized as that
child's parent.' In the traditional situation, an infant who is to be
adopted is relinquished by his or her natural mother and father
and given over to a new set of adoptive parents who accept the
legal responsibility to raise the child to adulthood.7 Typically, the
1. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743, 748
(1956); Note, The Adoption Dilemma: The Divergence of Theory and Practice, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 772 (1972).
2. See generally, W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. Russo, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES: A
STUDY OF INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS, 149-210 (1978), for a comprehensive survey of state
adoption statutes as of 1976. See also 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §§ 262-63 (1936).
3. Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 9, 10 (1982).
4. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173, 174-75
(1983).
5. Huard, supra note 1, at 746.
6. Huard, supra note 1, at 743.
7. Katz, supra note 3, at 9.
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events in an adoption are separable into two phases. First, there is
the physical placement of the child. Then there is the judicial proceeding to determine if the new parents' petition for adoption will
be granted.8
During the interim period before judicial approval of the new
parents' petition, the child is often in legal limbo: the natural parents have relinquished their rights to the child, the adoptive parents have physical custody of the child, but the newly formed family has not yet been granted permanent status." Despite this lack
of legal certainty in the relationship, however, the child, particularly if it is an infant, begins to establish psychological bonds with
the new custodial parents."0 If the parent-child bond is later broken because the prospective parents' adoption petition is not
granted, the child can experience severe psychological trauma. 1 As
a result, the physical placement of a child is a crucial step in the
adoption process.
Several states regulate adoption advertising activities. The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate the inherent legal problems
with adoption advertising and to determine whether such regulations are justified. First, adoption placement methods will be reviewed. Next, statutes regulating both adoption placement and
adoption advertising will be examined. The adoption advertising
statutes will also be analyzed to determine whether such prohibitions infringe upon the freedom of speech protected by the first
amendment to the United States Constitution. Finally, adoption
advertising methods that do not infringe upon constitutional freedoms will be discussed.
II.

METHODS OF ADOPTION PLACEMENT

All states permit the placement of children for adoption by
agencies, and most states also have a statutory procedure for licensing agencies which place children in adoptive homes. This type
of adoption placement is known as the "white market."1 2
8. Note, Babes and Barristers: Legal Ethics and Lawyer-Facilitated Independent
Adoptions, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 933, 936-38 (1984).
9. Katz, Freeing Children for Permanent Placement Through a Model Act, 12 FAM.
L.Q. 203 (1978).
10. Note, Independent Adoption: Regulating the Middleman, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 327,
334 (1985).
11. Comment, Independent Adoptions: Is the Black and White Beginning to Appear
in the Controversy Over Gray-Market Adoptions?, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 629, 645 n.91 (1980).
12. Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoption, 59
YALE L.J. 715, 717 (1950).
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In 1975, it was estimated that more than seventy-five percent of
adoptions in the United States took place through agencies. 3 An
adoption agency may be either publicly sponsored, as a department of the state government, or may be a private, non-profit entity. Both types of agencies are closely regulated by the state.1 ' In
an agency adoption, the natural parents relinquish the child to the
agency after the parents have been counseled.1 5 The agency then
places the child with adoptive parents, selected by the agency after
application and investigation procedures. 6 This method of agency
placement does not permit the natural parents to take part in de17
ciding where the child will be placed.
Agency placement has been criticized not only because it is administratively expensive, but also because adoptive parents may
have to wait three to seven years between their initial application
and child placement due to the long waiting list of prospective
adoptive parents. 8 In addition, several reports of court cases have
indicated that agencies have engaged in sharp competitive practices against private adoption placements.'
Beginning in the early 1970's, agency and private adoptions in
the United States decreased substantially in number, with as much
as a fifty percent reduction being experienced in some states. 20 The
increased use of contraception and abortion have reduced the
13. J. MCNAMARA, THE ADOPTION ADVISER 45 (1975).
14. Comment, supra note 11, at 629.
15. Note, supra note 10, at 329. Counseling includes a discussion of alternatives available to the parents. Id.
16. Comment, supra note 12, at 718.
17. Comment, supra note 11, at 646. See also Note, supra note 10, at 358; Note, supra
note 8, at 972-74.
18. Comment, supra note 11, at 647. See also Landes & Posner, The Economics of the
Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978); Note, supra note 10, at 331.
19. See, e.g., San Diego County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 1, 6,
496 P.2d 453, 456, 101 Cal. Rptr. 541, 544 (1972) (agency employee convinced a natural
mother to refuse consent to an independent adoption by the couple with whom her child
had been placed because they were too old; thereafter the natural mother relinquished the
child to the agency for adoptive placement); Terzian v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 286,
88 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1970) (county adoption agency was enabled to place a child with its own
adoptive clients after it submitted an unfavorable report to the court on the custodial parents who had raised the child from birth to three years of age); In re Christina N., 98 A.D.2d
894, 470 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1983) (county agency removed a child from the custody of its natural
mother and attempted to use her intent to place the child privately as evidence of neglect).
20. In 1970, approximately 175,000 children were adopted, 169,000 in 1971, and
140,000 in 1974. J. McNAMARA, supra note 13, at 25. See also Bodenheimer, New Trends
and Requirements in Adoptive Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L.
REv. 10, 13 (1975). Adoptions by stepparents have increased, however, because of the greater
number of divorces followed by remarriages. Id.
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number of children available for adoption, and the social stigma
against unmarried mothers keeping their babies has declined, all of
which have contributed to the shortage of adoptable newborn infants. 2 As the number of infants available to adoption agencies
began to dwindle after 1970, there was a corresponding increase in
the number of children who were placed without the intermediate
step of agency involvement.22
The placement of adoptable children without the involvement of
an agency has been the most controversial adoption practice and is
known by various names: private placement, independent adoption
and the "gray market. '23 Private placement is the most common
term used to describe this method of adoption, and is defined as
that method of child placement which does not require the services
of a licensed agency to act as an intermediary between the natural
and adoptive parents. 4 Private adoptions are also subject to state
regulations. 5
Most state private placement regulatory schemes attempt to
limit a "black market" in babies to prevent hopeful adoptive parents from paying large fees to unscrupulous intermediaries. 26
These regulatory schemes attempt to limit black market activities
because of the fear that commercial greed will replace a concern
for the child's welfare.27 Despite prohibitions against black market
activities, however, statutory provisions which allow the natural
create an
parents to place children directly with adoptive parents
28
market.
"gray
the
as
known
is
which
area
uncertain
Economic factors may tend to support private placement when it
is considered that states whose legislative adoption schemes prohibit private placements must appropriate greater funding to state
agencies. 29 This may be particularly significant because statistics
and surveys do not conclusively show that agency placements are
inherently more successful than private placements.3 0 Private
Bodenheimer, supra note 20, at 13.
J. McNAMARA, supra note 13, at 75. See also Baby Sales-For Big Profits, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 24, 1974, at 1.
23. Grove, Independent Adoption: The Case for the Gray Market, 13 VILL. L. REV.
116, 117 (1967).
24. Id.
25. Charney, The Rebirth of Private Adoptions, 71 A.B.A. J. 53, 55 (June 1985).
26. Comment, supra note 11, at 630.
27. See Grove, supra note 23, at 118-19.
28. tenBroek, California's Adoption Law and Programs, 6 HASTINGS L.J. 261, 337
(1955).
29. Note, Adoption Reform: A Proposal,10 NEW ENG. L. REv. 371, 387 (1971).
30. Podolski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption Placement, 9
21.
22.
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adoptions usually only require twelve to eighteen months31 and
have led to many successful family relationships.3 2 These factors
combined with the economic concerns associated with exclusive
agency placement support improving, not dismantling existing
statutory methods for private placement.33
Private adoptions and black market placements are also inadvertently encouraged by the restrictions which agencies place on their
lists of adoptive couples. These restrictions include such limitations as refusing to make placements with parents who are beyond
a maximum age or into a home where there already is one natural
or adopted child.3 4 As a result, private placements rather than
agency placements appear to be the modern trend.3 5
Due to the modern trend towards private placement, there appear to be statistically fewer agency placements. 6 This statisical
perception coupled with a heavy demand on agencies by adopting
parents, encourages the black market.3 7 Since the "black market"
is universally agreed to be immoral and a practice to be discouraged,38 the majority of states now have statutory restrictions on
the passage of money between the parties in an adoption
placement.3 9
III.
A.

REGULATION OF ADOPTION

Limitations on Placement

A few states provide for a totally "white market" approach to
FAM. L.Q. 547, 548 n.2. (1975). No evidence has been found that private placements are less

successful than those handled by agencies. Model State Adoption Act and Model State
Adoption Procedures; Recommendations of the Model Adoption Legislation and Procedures Advisory Panel, 45 Fed. Reg. 10,622, 10,659 (1980).
31. Charney, supra note 25, at 71.
32. Grove, supra note 23, at 135.
33. Id. at 136.
34. Comment, supra note 11, at 647.
35. Charney, supra note 25, at 55. In some states as many as 80 percent of all newborn
adoptions are private.
•36. Id.
37. Podolski, supra note 30, at 547.
38. In 1978 Congress gave authorization for a study of the placement of children in
adoptive homes by unlicensed persons without regulation by any government entity. 42
U.S.C. § 5114 (Supp. II 1978). The effect of this provision in the Act was stated in the
legislative history to be a call for a study of black market adoptions. Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-266 (1978), 95 Stat. 557,
591. See also Grove, supra note 23, at 119-21; Note, supra note 10, at 333-34. See generally
Note, Black Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 48 (1976).
39. MEEZAN, KATZ & Russo, supra note 2, at 182.
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adoption by permitting only agency placements.4" A statute allowing only agency placements should logically prohibit placement
by all intermediaries, agents or natural parents who are not licensed, and should include the imposition of criminal penalties for
prohibited placement activities.4 1
Generally, the severity level of punishment for violation of an
adoption statute varies widely among the different statutes and at
least one proposal would effectively equate illegal placement for
profit with the crime of murder. 2 The criminal sanctions against
unlawful child placement in existing statutory schemes are treated
independently from the adoption process and therefore lose some
of their regulatory effectiveness.43 Relatively few cases holding persons criminally liable for such activities have been reported primarily due to sporadic enforcement of statutes which prohibit nonlicensed placement of children.4 Activities that have been prosecuted have included significant participation in child placement,
receipt of compensation for placement services, and exertion of undue influence over a natural mother to give up her child.' 5
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904 (Michie 1981); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 28A § 11
(West Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-10-116 (1980).
41. Note, supra note 29, at 376-77.
42. See, e.g., Note, supra note 29, at 397, which suggests a penalty of 25 to 50 years
imprisonment for non-licensed advertising of placement services, and life imprisonment
without parole for accepting consideration in a non-licensed child placement.
43. Comment, supra note 11, at 645 n.91.
44. These statutes are often called "Baby Broker Acts." See generally Annotation,
Criminal Liability of One Arranging for Adoption of Child Through Other Than Licensed
Child Placement Agency ("Baby Broker Acts"), 3 A.L.R. 4th 468 (1981). See also tenBroek,
supra note 28, at 336.
45. See, e.g., Galison v. District of Columbia, 402 A.2d 1263 (D.C. 1979) (attorney arranged placement without a license and through coercion of the natural mother by financial
enticements); Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657 (D.C. 1963) (attorney acted as
an unlicensed intermediary for placement of a child); Goodman v. District of Columbia, 50
A.2d 812 (D.C. 1947) (attorney failed to refrain from serving as a placing agent for a baby);
People v. Schwartz, 64 Ill.2d 275, 356 N.E.2d 8, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1976) (attorney
accepted compensation in excess of a reasonable fee for the placement of a child); Montana
Dept. of Soc. & Rehabilitation Servs. v. Angel, 176 Mont. 293, 577 P.2d 1223 (1978) (physician and attorney enjoined from continuing to place children for adoption without a license); State v. Segal, 78 N.J. Super. 273, 188 A.2d 416 (App. Div. 1963) (attorney acted as
intermediary for placement of baby and paid a portion of his fee to the natural parents);
State v. Wasserman, 75 N.J. Super. 480, 183 A.2d 467, afJ'd, 39 N.J. 516, 189 A.2d 218
(1962) (court revoked suspension of defendant's sentence for negotiating with expectant
parents for the sale of their unborn children); People v. Michelman, 93 Misc.2d 297, 403
N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (attorney acted as an unlicensed intermediary for three
placements and received large fees as compensation for his participation); In re Slater, 8
A.D.2d 169, 186 N.Y.S.2d 558 (App. Div. 1959) (attorney who had advertised in newspapers
for babies and adoptive parents was disbarred); People v. Slater, 304 N.Y. 896, 110 N.E.2d
503, 113 N.Y.S.2d 284, reh'g denied, 305 N.Y. 569, 111 N.E.2d 442 (1953) (evidence upon
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Criminal sanctions which punish an individual who illegally
places a child for adoption serve mainly to intimidate and limit the
conduct of lawful citizens. These sanctions do little to limit black
marketeers, who are remunerated for their acceptance of the risk
of prosecution.4
Removal of the child from the custody of the adoptive parents
has been suggested as the most effective means to enforce statutory limitations.' Courts have sometimes resorted to this severe
sanction in light of illegalities in the adoption procedure. 8 However, courts have also refused to remove the child from its custodial home even where there has been a statutory violation if such
action would not be in the best interests of the child.4 9 This is due
to the fact that a court's decision in granting a decree of adoption
is an independent judgment as to what relationship will be in the
child's best interest and recognition that a bonded family relationship should not generally be destroyed even when there is a statutory infraction. 0
In addition to the enforcement of criminal sanctions, courts have
broad discretion in adoption proceedings and often exercise this
discretion by approving adoption placements which have technically violated the statutes. Courts may also impose non-criminal
sanctions against natural parents who request compensation as a
condition of continuing pre-adoption consent. These sanctions may
take the form of judicial refusal to grant the natural parent's application for revocation of consent."
which convictions were based was not disclosed by the appellate court).
46. Podolski, supra note 30, at 552.
47. Grove, supra note 23, at 131. See also Note, Improving the Adoption Process: The
Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 767 (1954).
48. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 46 Misc. 2d 928, 261 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Fain. Ct. 1965),
where failure to fulfill the statutory requirement of placement resulted in denial of the
adoption; Gray v. Maxwell 206 Neb. 385, 293 N.W.2d 90 (1980), in which the court distinguished between the payment of expenses and a separate payment to the natural mother,
and held that the latter aspect was against public policy to such an extent that the natural
mother's relinquishment would be invalid; In re Adoption of Seifner, 627 P.2d 456 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1981), where the lack of an investigation of the adoptive parents resulted in an
invalidation of the adoption decree.
49. See Note, Black Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 48, 60 (1976). See also Note,
supra note 10, at 337 nn.90-92, and 347, nn. 165-66.
50. Courts may ignore both criminal prohibitions and conditional agreements between
an agency and adoptive parents to continue a placement which has become a bonded family
relationship. See In re McDonald, 43 Cal.2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954), where the adoption
decree was affirmed although the adoptive father had committed suicide between the time
of placement and the grant of the decree.
51. See In re Anonymous, 286 A.D. 161, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90, appeal denied, 286 A.D. 968,
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Courts are often faced with situations involving non-agency intermediaries regardless whether private placements are permitted
or prohibited. In some states which prohibit placement by intermediaries while allowing placement by the natural parents, the
statutes have been liberally interpreted to permit the involvement
of third parties as agents of the natural parents."2 Intermediaries
may also play a role in eluding adoption statutes that purport to
53
prevent private placement.
The court's role in an adoption proceeding is also very significant. A court reviewing a petition for adoption has the authority to
look to the adoption process in its entirety and to apply the statutory standards to prior placement activities conducted in another
state.5 4 Since the legislative purpose of an adoption statute often
expressly states that an adoption statute should be broadly construed to promote the best interest of the child, a court may consider the child's interest to outweigh the punitive aspects of unlawful placement activities.5 5 A court may also rely on express
146 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1955). See also In re E.W.C., 89 Misc. 2d 64, 389 N.Y.S.2d 743
(Fam. Ct. 1976), where the court denied the natural mother's application for revocation of
her consent to the adoption although the parents' attorney had illegally received compensation for the placement.
52. See, e.g., In re Minor, 338 Mass. 635, 156 N.E.2d 801 (1959), where it was held
that a natural mother's significant role in placement did not prevent a physician from actually placing the child as her agent despite the statutory prohibition against intermediaries.
But see 1953 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 23-35, which states that an unlicensed intermediary
acting as an agent of the natural parents cannot place a child for adoption where the principal is bound by statute to give personal attention to such acts.
53. Grove, supra note 23, at 126.
54. See, e.g., In re Gates, 6 Kan. App. 2d 945, 636 P.2d 818 (1981), in which the court
held that Kansas law would be applied to determine the validity of a consent executed in
California.
55. See In re Adoption of Child by T., 164 N.J. Super. 476, 397 A.2d 341 (App. Div.
1978), where the court held that dismissal of a petition for adoption because the adoptive
parents had received custody of the child through an unlicensed intermediary and had made
a large payment to an out-of-state attorney was an abuse of discretion where the approval of
the adoption would otherwise have been in the child's best interests. See also OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 109.305 (1984), which states that the adoption statute is not governed by the rule
that statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed. But see In re CDT,
415 So.2d 315 (La. Ct. App. 1982), where the court reversed the trial court's decree of adoption due to informalities in the consent procedure, stating that adoption laws must be
strictly construed in favor of parents because such laws are in derogation of natural rights;
In re Anonymous, 46 Misc. 2d 928, 261 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Fam. Ct. 1965), where the court denied an adoption petition because the prospective adoptive parents had received custody of
the child from an attorney who had solicited the arrangement of both the natural mother
and physicians; Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St. 3d 258, 452 N.E.2d 1304 (1983), in which the
court stated that the procedure for independently placing a child for adoption is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. The court issued a writ of habeas
corpus directing the attorneys who had arranged an illegal private adoption to return the
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statutory directions to construe penal provisions strictly in setting
aside a criminal complaint for the illegal placement of a child for
the purpose of adoption."
Society is benefited when all children are provided with adult
care and homes which provide for the protection, guidance and
growth of the child.5 7 Children who do not have a supportive family environment may become wards of the state, and an added burden to society.5 8 The social problems associated with caring for
children who are without natural parents demands a solution that
is psychologically, economically and legally efficient. 59 As a result,
courts are given a great deal of discretion to determine whether a
previous placement should be granted legal permanence through
the approval of an adoption petition.6 0 In making its decision, the
court should command the submission of all information necessary
to make a reasoned judgment including a determination whether
to approve the adoption or to impose separate criminal sanctions.6
The variety of circumstances surrounding an adoption is more appropriately weighed by the court before making a judgment, and
agency information and reports on the suitability of the adoptive
home are typically limited to their role as evidence for the court's
consideration.6 2 Therefore, the role of the court is to consider all
the evidence, including the agency information, and to determine
what is in the best interests of the child to be adopted. 3
An adult's legal right to act as the parent of his biological child
does not necessarily assure that the biological parent will provide
child to the natural parents. See Note, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 323 (1983). See also In re Kraft,

No. L-83-389, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. May 4, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library,
Ohio file) (the adoption statute is necessarily in derogation of common law and must be
strictly construed).
56. See, e.g., People v. Scopas, 11 N.Y.2d 120, 181 N.E.2d 754, 227 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1962),
which involved an intercontinental scheme whereby children were legally adopted in Greece
prior to joining their adoptive parents in New York; the court held that such activities do
not entail the provision of care and therefore were not within the "placing out" prohibited
by the statute. See also People v. Issachar, 24 Misc. 2d 826, 203 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Crim. Ct.
1960), in which the court felt constrained to a strict construction despite its expressed disapproval of the circuitous method of international adoption.
57. Katz, supra note 9. See also Huard, supra note 1, at 749.
58. Comment, supra note 12, at 718.
59. See Article, Children and the Law - A Symposium; Child Placement: Law and
Theory, 20 CATH. LAW. 85 (1974)

60. Note, supra note 1, at 780.
61. Merrill & Merrill, Toward Uniformity in Adoption Law, 40 IowA L. REv. 299, 31112 (1955).
62. Comment, supra note 11, at 640 n.69.
63. Note, supra note 1, at 782.
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continuous nurturing to the child.64 A satisfactory parent-child relationship is more dependent upon the parent's day-to-day care of
the child than on a biological blood tie." As a result, in determining the best interests of the child, courts have shifted from using
their own vague generalizations to relying on psychological
parenthood criteria." When a family unit is functioning properly,
the best interests of the child are clearly satisfied by preserving
7
that family.1
A "psychological parent" concept was introduced in 1973, to
support the argument that child placement decisions should be
made/before birth so that the child received consistent and dependable caregiving."8 A psychological best interest test has also
been advocated to limit the natural parents' rights to remove a
child from his custodial home when removal would be considered
harmful."9 The courts, however, have found it difficult to intrude
on the traditional right of the natural parents to choose their children's circumstances.70 Despite this hesitation however, courts
have begun to weigh the needs and best interests of the child separately from those of the parents.7 1 Courts have looked favorably on
a consistent family situation and familiarity with the daily environment because of the importance of these factors to a child. 2
This also strongly supports the conclusion that the child's interests
are best served by an initial placement immediately after birth
that is well-planned and treated as permanent.
64. Solnit, PsychologicalDimensions in Child Placement Conflicts, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 495, 496 (1984).
65. Id. at 497.
66. Such criteria describe the mutual interaction between parent and child in terms of
love, attention, basic trust and confidence. Note, Adoption-Psychological v. Biological
Parenthoodin Determining the Best Interests Of The Child, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 130, 135
(1971). In In re P, and Wife, 114 N.J.Super. 584, 277 A.2d. 566 (App. Div. 1971), the court
specifically acknowledged the "focused relationship" and "affection relationship" phases
during the first nine to eleven months of a child's life, during which period a separation
from the acting mother would be severely traumatic. Id. at 594, 277 A. 2d at 571.

67.

Solnit, supra note 64, at 499, citing J. GOLDSTEIN, A.

FREUD

& A.

SOLNIT, BEYOND

THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 5 (1979).

68. McNAMARA, supra note 13, at 136, citing GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note
67, at 45.
69. Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving
Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 157-70 (1963).
70. See, e.g., Note, 13 WASHBURN L.J. 228, 230 (1974).
71. See, e.g., Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972). See
also In re P, and wife, 114 N.J. Super. 584, 277 A.2d 566 (App. Div. 1971); Note, supra note
66.
72. Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation:Modification of Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. COLO. L. RED. 495 (1975).
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Other Regulations

In states which permit non-agency intermediaries, doctors or
lawyers have been permitted to make referrals of natural parents
to prospective adoptive parents and to receive professional fees for
the medical or legal services provided in connection with the subsequent birth or adoption.73 However, unreasonable fees which are
in fact compensation for the placement itself are generally violations of the state statute."' Agreements to pay for the medical expenses incurred by the natural mother of a prospective adoptive
child have been considered valid and enforceable. 5 A natural
mother may even be required to reimburse the adoptive parents
for expenses paid on her behalf if she breaches the agreement by
7
falling to voluntarily relinquish her rights to the child.
Successful private placements may be encouraged by requiring
pre-placement investigation of the facts by a social agency or court
appointed investigator.7 7 In this way, intermediaries in independent adoptions can be regulated so as to prevent irresponsible
placements.7 8 However, requiring pre-placement studies of prospective parents in independent adoptions would entail government intrusion which may inhibit the private aspect of the place79
ment as well as impose economic burdens on the state.
Many statutory adoption schemes require a probationary period
between placement and the final adoption decree to permit an opportunity to evaluate the compatibility of the child and the adoptive home.80 Six months is typically deemed sufficient for the new
family members to become accustomed to one another.8 1 Some
73. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposalsfor
Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. Rv. 10, 18 (1975).
74. Id., n.36.
75. See, e.g., 171 Okla. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 336, stating the opinion that it is lawful for
prospective adoptive parents to guarantee payment of hospital and medical expenses of a
natural mother, within the statute against trafficking in children.
76. See Gordon v. Cutler, 324 Pa. Super. 35, 471 A.2d 449 (1983), where a natural
mother was ordered to reimburse the adoptive parents for her medical expenses when she
decided to keep the child. Id. at 38, 471 A.2d at 450. The court concluded that it was not
"ipso facto" contrary to public policy for adoptive parents to conditionally pay the natural
mother's hospital and medical expenses, because it was in the best interests of the child that
the mother receive good medical care. Id. at 51-52, 471 A.2d at 457. The payment of the
expenses was deemed to be on behalf of the child. Id. at 55, 471 A.2d at 458.
77. Podolski, supra note 46, at 549.
78. Id. at 551-52.
79. tenBroek, supra note 28, at 349.
80. Comment, Revocation of Parental Consent to Adoption: Legal Doctrine and Social Policy, 28 U. CH. L. REv. 564, 568-69 (1961).
81. Note, supra note 29, at 387. See also UrF. ADOPTION Acr § 12, 9 U.L.A. 39 (1979).
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statutes also treat the period prior to the final decree as a time for
the natural parents to evaluate their decision by allowing the natural parents to revoke their consent until that time. 2
It has been suggested that all natural parents who expect to
place their infants for adoption should be offered prenatal counseling.8" The theory behind this suggestion is that it is in the best
interests of the child to be placed as quickly as possible after
birth.84 Other proposed regulations would provide independent legal counsel to the the child to assure the child's status as a party to
the adoption proceeding."6 Further, it has been argued that an independent person educated in the social sciences should also be
appointed to represent the child in such proceedings to protect the
child's social and psychological interests.8 6 However, the appointment of a guardian ad litem is not usually a statutory requirement.87 Nor has independent legal counsel for the child been held
to be a necessary constitutional protection.88
C.

Limitations on Advertising

Nearly one-third of the states have express limitations on adoption advertising. 89 Some of the advertising prohibitions were spe82. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 28A, § 5A (West 1981), which requires that the
child have resided with the petitioners for at least six months, up until which time the
natural parents may revoke consent with proof that the consent was obtained under duress,
undue influence or fraud. See also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2531(b)(5), 2711(c) (Purdon
Supp. 1985), which allows revocation of a natural parent's consent to adoption until the
entry of a decree of adoption if no decree of termination of parental rights has yet been
entered.
83. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 67, at 45.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 5-6.
86. Note, supra note 29, at 378.
87. See, e.g., In re Smith, 6 Kan. App. 2d 575, 631 P.2d 255 (1981).
88. See, e.g., In re D., 24 Or.App. 601, 547 P.2d 175, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976),
where the court held that due process did not require the appointment of independent legal
counsel for the child in every adoption proceeding, and that whether such a measure was
necessary in a particular case or would needlessly complicate the matter was within the trial
court's discretion.
89. ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1977); CAL. CIv. CODE § 224p (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
63.212 (1)(h)(West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-509
(Supp. 1984); Ky REv. STAT. ANN § 199.590(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1984); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 28A § 14 (West Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-701 (Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §
127.310 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-E:14 (Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-38
(1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.17 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 866(4)
(West 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-8a-1 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §63.1-196(d)(1980); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.36.040(1983).
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cifically intended to limit private adoptions." More often, however,
the prohibitions against adoption advertising appear to be related
to a legislative desire to curb black market activities by limiting
communication between natural parents and adoptive parents."1
Georgia has the most restrictive adoption advertising statute.
This statute makes it unlawful for any person other than a licensed
child-placing agency to advertise publically or privately, including
making oral statements, for an adoption.92 Virginia has the least
restrictive statute. This statute prohibits a licensed child-welfare
agency from distributing in any printed form an advertisement
which contains any untrue, deceptive or misleading information. 3
Statutes taking the middle ground usually permit advertising contingent upon the prior approval of a court or state administrative
agency.94
Adoption advertising is treated with many different levels of definition and specificity. The most general and inclusive statutes are
those which prohibit unlicensed parties from advertising through
any medium whatsoever.9 8 Other statutes appear to limit the
meaning of unlicensed advertising to broadcast or printed forms of
media for public or private distribution." The intended scope of
some statutes encompasses only the use of public media by nonlicensed parties.97 Still other statutes proscribe non-licensed adver90. tenBroek, supra note 28, at 304.
91. Note, supra note 10, at 345; Note, supra note 8.
92. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19(a)(1982); infra notes 125-28.
93. VA. CODE § 63.1-196(d)(1980).
94. ALA. CODE § 26-10-8(1977)(court commitment); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 28A §
14(West Supp. 1985)(written approval of the office for children); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5103.17(Anderson 1981)(court commitment).
95. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(h) (West Supp. 1985)("advertise or offer to the public,
in any way, by any medium whatever"); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19(a)(1982)("advertise... by
any other public medium or by any private means, including letters, circulars, handbills, and
oral statements"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(1)(Baldwin Supp. 1984)("advertise in any
manner"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.36.040(1983)("No person, as an inducement to a woman to go to any ... place of refuge for confinement care, shall in any way offer . .. or
advertise ... or hold himself out directly or indirectly").
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-509(Supp. 1984)("communicate by newspaper, radio, television, handbills, placards or other print, broadcast or electronic medium"); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
48-38(1984)("publish, transmit, broadcast, or otherwise distribute any advertisement of any
type whatsoever"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-8a-l(Supp. 1985)("any card, sign or device.. . or
allow any announcement to appear, in any newspaper, magazine, directory, or on radio or
television or advertise by any other means"); VA. CODE §63.1-196(d)(1980)("make, publish,
disseminate, circulate, or place before the public ....
in a newspaper, poster, blueprint,
map, bill, tag, label, circular, pamphlet, or letter, or in other way an advertisement of any

sort").
97.

CAL. CIv. CODE § 224p(West 1982)("advertises in any periodical or newspaper, by
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tising without specific definition of the term."8
Advertising prohibitions do not by themselves prevent people
from profiting from adoption placement. 99 Prohibiting a person or
organization from using advertising media does not guarantee an
end to their undesirable activities. 10 0 The placement of children
can easily continue, despite a ban on advertising, through word of
mouth solicitations of clients, and this form of communication is
less capable of detection by enforcement officials. 01
Few cases involving adoption advertising prosecutions have been
reported.1 0 2 In one case, a state agency was prohibited from discriminating against a parent who had arranged an adoption using
advertising because the adoption statute did not prohibit
advertising.103
Surrogate mothers, who agree to place a child for adoption with
the natural father's family prior to being artificially impregnated,
are often solicited through advertising. 104 Such arrangements are
radio, or other public medium"); MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch.28A § 14(West Supp. 1985)("cause to
be published in a newspaper.. . or to be broadcast on a radio or television station in the
commonwealth an advertisement or notice"); NEv. REv. STAT. § 127.310(1979)("advertises in
any periodical or newspaper, or by radio or other public medium"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
170-E:14(Supp. 1983)("advertise or cause to be published an advertisement").
98. ALA. CODE § 26-10-8(1977)("advertisement . . . or hold out inducements"); NEB.
Rav. STAT. §43-701(Supp. 1985)("advertise"); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §5103.17(Anderson
hold out inducements"); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 866(4)(West
1981)("advertise ...
1983)("offering... or advertising... as an inducement to any woman to enter ... place
for maternity care").
99. Grove, supra note 23, at 126.
100. Note, supra note 10, at 352.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., People v. Silverton, 71 Cal. App. 3d 790, reh'g denied, 139 Cal. Rptr.
584 (1977)(conviction for advertising adoption placement without a license affirmed).
103. See In re Christina N., 98 A.D. 2d 894, 470 N.Y.S. 2d 882(1983), in which the
court affirmed an order to the county agent for the return of a child to the natural mother
who intended to privately place the child for adoption. Id. at 896, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 884. The
agency had attempted to characterize the mother's intent to arrange a private adoption as
evidence of neglect that would justify the agency's removal of custody from the mother. Id.
at 895, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 883. The court noted that the adoption statute clearly contemplated
private adoptions and regulated the inherent placement risks through a scheme of
mandatory investigation procedures. Id., 470 N.Y.S.2d at 884. The court affirmed the trial
court's refusal to entertain testimony on the relative merits of different adoption methods as
immaterial in a neglect proceeding. Id. at 896, N.Y.S.2d at 884. In this case the natural
mother had made direct contact with the prospective adoptive parents, without an intermediary, by means of an advertisement in a local shopper's newspaper. Id. at 895, 470 N.Y.S.
2d at 883.
104. Note, Surrogate Motherhood: ContractualIssues and Remedies Under Legislative Proposals,23 WASHBuRN LJ. 601(1984). See generally Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 17 FAm L.Q. 198 (1983). See also Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the Protection of Choice, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv.291, 297-98(1982); Note,
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typically governed by existing state adoption statutes and often violate public policy standards.10 5 Specific legislation for application
to surrogate mother situations which has been proposed has often
failed to be enacted.' 0 6 However, some courts have held that surrogate motherhood contracts which provide for the payment of
money to the natural mother in exchange for placing the baby with
07
the natural father and step-mother are either void or voidable.'
Attorney general opinions have also concluded that the surrogate
motherhood arrangement is a violation of adoption advertising
statutes because such arrangements hold out inducements for
mothers to part with their children. 08 However, at least one commentator has concluded that prohibiting surrogate mothers from
advertising is an impermissible limitation if the underlying activity
is constitutionally protected. 0 9
D.

Uniform Statutes

Many commentators have focused on the inconsistency of statutory adoption schemes among the states." 0 Uniform statutes have
been promulgated, partly in the belief that states with less stringent adoption procedures may become havens for black market activities."' Enacting uniform state procedures and practices is considered crucial to the curtailment of the black market and its
abuses."'
Contracts to Bear a Child, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 611(1978).
105. Note, Surrogate Motherhood: ContractualIssues and Remedies Under Legislative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 601, 603 (1984).
106. Note, supra note 105, at 603 n.18, 617-28.
107. See, e.g., Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981); Note, Surrogate Motherhood: The Outer Limits of Protected Conduct, 4 Dgr. C.L. REv. 1131(1981). See
also Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1986), rev'g No. 84CA-136-MR, slip op.(Ky. Ct. App. April 26, 1985) (dismissal of a complaint filed against a
corporation alleging in part a violation of a state statute prohibiting non-licensed persons
from accepting remuneration for the procurement of a child for adoption purposes
affirmed).
108. See 1983 Ohio Att'y Gen. Op. No. 1 (available on LEXIS, States library, Ohio
file), in which the attorney reasoned that a person not licensed as a child-placing agency was
prohibited from advertising or soliciting women for artificial insemination or contracting for
the bearing and placement of children for a fee. See also 1982 Kan. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 150;
Note, supra note 105, at 607-09; 1981 Ky. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 18; Wadlington, Artificial
Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REv. 465, 481 (1983); Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting:A CriticalAnalysis of the Recent Kentucky Experience, 69
Ky. L.J. 877, 891-900(1980-81).
109. Graham, supra note 104, at 297-98.
110. Note, supra note 60, at 773.
111. Grove, supra note 23, at 126.
112. Howe, supra note 5, at 193.
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The Uniform Adoption Act was proposed in 1953 and revised in
1969, but has not been adopted or followed by a majority of
states.113 The Uniform Adoption Act places no restrictions on who
may place or advertise for a child, but requires that the petition
for adoption filed with the court include the name of the person
who placed the child with the petitioning adoptive parent. " The
Uniform Adoption Act also regulates the adoption placement by
including in the court's evaluation an investigation made by an
agency or other person appointed by the court. " 5
Under the Uniform Adoption Act, an adoption decree may be
entered six months after the date of an agency's actual placement
of a child, but the six month period does not begin to run for a
private placement until the court or the state welfare department
has been informed that the adoptive parents have taken custody of
the child. 1 6 The Act acknowledges that in the case of private
placements, no investigation is possible prior to the placement because the court's first notice of the private placement occurs when
the adoption petition is filed and the child has already been
placed. 1 7 The Act further states that no post-placement investigation is required for agency directed placements if other evidence
shows that the child and the adoptive home are suited to each
other."'
Under the Uniform Adoption Act, a natural parent's consent
cannot be withdrawn after the entry of a decree of adoption, but
can be withdrawn before that time by court order if the court finds
19
that withdrawal of consent is in the best interests of the child.
This provision makes placement after consent of the natural parents fairly certain and places the child's interests on a higher footing than those of the natural parents. 2 0 The only penalty which
the Uniform Adoption Act imposes on private placement is one of
delay in granting the adoption petition if the court is not given
prompt notice of the initial placement. 2 1 The policy of the Act is
113. Only seven states, Alaska, Arkansas, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio
and Oklahoma, have adopted statutes which are substantially similar to the Uniform Adoption Act. 9 U.LA. 1 (Supp. 1985).
114. UNi. ADOPTION AcT § 9(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. 34 (1979).
115. UN!F. ADOPTION ACT § 11(b), (d), 9 U.L.A. 36-37 (1979).
116. UNi'. ADOPTION AcT § 12, 9 U.L.A. 38, 40 comm'rs' note (1979).
117. 9 U.L.A. 38, comm'rs' note (1979).
118. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 11(e), 9 U.L.A. 37 (1979).
119. See UNI?. ADOPTION AcT § 8, 9 U.L.A- 32-33 (1979).
120. UNI. ADOPTION AT § 8, 9 U.LA. 33,. comm'rs' note (1979).
121. See UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 12, 9 U.L.A. 38, 40 comm'rs' note (1979).
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that "black market" improprieties during the placement should
not cause a denial of the adoption decree if the adoptive home is
suitable and the new family situation is, in fact, in the best inter122
ests of the child.
Under the Uniform Adoption Act, the petitioning adoptive parents must give the court a full accounting of all expenses incurred
in connection with the prenatal care, birth or placement of the
child, and for any other services relating to the placement or the
adoption. 2 3 The stated purpose of this section of the Act is to allow the court control over the expenditures involved in private
placements, but not to invalidate the adoption if, in fact, the adoptive parents have made excessive payments to the natural mother
or an intermediary as a condition for her consent to the placement. 12 4 The Uniform Adoption Act also contains an all-inclusive
statute of limitations that brings finality to most adoptions after
one year. 2 5
In 1978, a Model Act to Free Children for Permanent Placement
was developed under a grant from the United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare.1'2 The Model Act grants total
discretion to the court to validate any contractual agreement for
the surrender of a child, using a standard that the interests of the
child should prevail over those of the parents. 27 The Model Act
also introduces the concept of a "de facto parent" who has had
continuous physical control of a child for one year and with whom
the child has developed significant emotional ties.128 The inclusion
of the de facto parent relationship is an allowance for the private
placement situation and recognizes the importance of continuous
psychological bonds to the development of a child. 2 9 Unlike many
existing state adoption statutes which require social investigation
in all cases, the Model Act leaves the need for a psycho-social assessment of the child's needs in cases of voluntary relinquishment
to the sound discretion of the court. 30
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Re122. Id.
123. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 10(a), 9 U.L.A. 35-36 (1979).
124. UNIw. ADOPTION AcT § 10, 9 U.L.A. 36, comm'rs' note (1979).
125. UNIF. ADOPTION AcT §15(b), 9 U.L.A. 47 (1979).
126. Katz, FreeingChildren for Permanent Placement Through a Model Act, 12 FAM.
L.Q. 203 (1978).
127. Id. at 206-08.
128. Id. at 210, 212.
129. Id. at 223.
130. Id. at 235-36.
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form Act of 1978 mandated the creation of an independent expert
panel to recommend model adoption legislation to the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare."' Its proposal for a Model State
Adoption Act was presented in 1980, and represented the most recent effort to achieve uniformity of control over the adoption process. 3 2s The Model State Adoption Act did not place any restriction on advertising for adoption placement. Adoption placements
were permitted only by licensed agencies or natural parents, in accordance with the practices allowed in the majority of states. "3
However, the Act did not prohibit the efforts of an intermediary in
locating a potential adoptive home for a child, and recognized such
parties as agents acting on behalf of the natural parents. 3" Parents
were required to notify the court within forty-eight hours of a private placement. 13 These provisions appeared to be due to the
opinion expressed by the drafting panel that a total prohibition of
private placements would overburden agencies and their limited financial resources, and in addition would divert attention from
homeless children with special needs, to infants. 13e However, to
prevent black market activities, the Model State Adoption Act also
prohibited the exchange of compensation beyond legitimate expenses in connection with the placement of a child, and imposed
37
harsh criminal penalties for such activity.
The Model State Adoption Act provided for efficiency without
administrative intervention where the natural parents wished to
directly and immediately place their newborn child into an adoptive home. " This form of direct placement precluded any disrup131. 42 U.S.C. § 5112(a) (Supp. II 1978).
132. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,622 (1980).
133. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,659 (1980).
134. Id.
135. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,662 (1980).
136. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,659 (1980).
137. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,656 (1980). Sections 107(f) and (g) provide as follows:
(f) No person, agency, association, or corporation shall offer, give, request, receive, or
accept payment of cash or other consideration for the procurement of a child for a
prospective adoptive family, except that:
(1) reasonable fees for professional services may be charged for services provided with
respect to the placement of a child pursuant to Section 205 of this Act; and
(2) an agency, or the prospective adoptive parents of a child to be placed for adoption
pursuant to Section 206 of this Act, may pay the actual medical expenses associated
with the birth of the child to be placed for adoption.
(g) Any violation of subsection (f)of this Section 107 shall be punished by a fine of
no more than $20,000 or imprisonment of no longer than ten years, or both.

Id.
138.

45 Fed. Reg. 10,659 (1980).
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tion in the child's home life and was considered superior to the
typical agency plan of providing foster care between birth and
placement. 139 The Model State Adoption Act also contained provisions protecting the identities of the adoptive parents, upon the
consent of the natural parents.1 4 These provisions allowed contact
between the child and its natural parents to be eliminated in order
14 1
to strengthen the adoptive family relationship.
The Model State Adoption Act also did not let the passage of
unlawful compensation destroy the adoption placement if a suitable parent-child relationship had been effected. 4" The Act can
therefore be seen as a reflection of the statutory scheme in effect in
most states regarding adoption placements: permitting private
placements under the scrutiny of the court, outlawing outright
baby selling or buying, and making an effort to prohibit advertis1 43
ing as a part of child placement
More recently, the Adoption Committee of the Family Law Section of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws was directed in 1983 to draft a model act that treated
agency and private adoptions in a balanced and non-preferential
manner." Work on this model act has not been completed.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE REGULATION OF
ADVERTISING

Courts have increasingly held that a greater proportion of advertising activities are within the protection of the first amendment. 45
In general, speech may legitimately be restricted when its exercise
interferes with other social values, personal rights or civil liberties. 4 6 However, the Supreme Court has stated that sensitive tools
must be utilized to separate protected and unprotected expres139.
140.

Comment, supra note 11, at 645.
45 Fed. Reg. 10,663 (1980).
141. MEEZAN, KATZ & Russo, supra note 2, at 101-02.
142. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,663 (1980). Section 206(e)(3)(B) provides, in part, as follows:
"[Where a violation of Section 107(f) of this Act has occurred the court, in its discretion,
may permit the child to remain in the custody of the adoptive parents if such a plan is in
the interest of the child."
143. The legislation in its final form was entitled the Model Act for the Adoption of
Children with Special Needs, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,022 (1981). The draft proposal sections concerning private placements were omitted from the final version because they were not relevant to the new focus on facilitating the adoption of special needs children. Id.
144. Howe, supra note 5, at 195.
145. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (1977).
146. Id.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 25:129

sion.147 Likewise, similarly sensitive tools must also be used to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech.1" 8
Advertisement that is not purely commercial has been held to be
protected by the first amendment. 14 9 This is due to the fact that an
advertisement of this type communicates valuable facts of general
public interest, and is not merely an offer of a commercial transaction.1 5 The Supreme Court has recognized that it is necessary to
apply a balancing approach to government restriction of speech in
situations where pervasive regulations are necessary, such as the
censorship of prisoner mail.15 1 In such cases, a two-step standard of
review is required. First, the state must demonstrate a substantial
governmental interest which is unrelated to the prohibition of free
speech, and second, the speech restriction must be no broader than
52
necessary to protect the relevant state interest.1
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 58 the Supreme Court held that commercial speech
was protected by the first amendment, although commercial
speech could be subject to regulation within limits.'" The Supreme Court has also held that the state may not restrain
nondeceptive commercial speech merely to prevent a certain type
of behavior by the recipients of the information. 55
In Bates v.State Bar of Arizona,'5 6 the Supreme Court held
147. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
148. Lee, The Problems of "Reasonable Access" to Broadcasting for Noncommercial
Expression: Content Discrimination,Appellate Review, and Separationof Commercial and
Noncommercial Expression, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 348, 395 (1982). See generally Machina,
Freedom of Expression in Commerce, 3 LAW & PHIL. 375 (1984).
149. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). In Bigelow, the Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute that prohibited publication of information that would encourage
abortions. See also Note, 10 U. RICH. L. REV.427 (1976).
150. 421 U.S. at 822. See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977),
(statute prohibiting contraceptives advertising was an unconstitutional restriction of the
dissemination of information about legal products and services).
151. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
152. Id. at 413.
153. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
154. Id. at 773. The Court said, "What is at issue is whether a State may completely
suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity,
fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. Reserving other
questions, we conclude that the answer to this one is in the negative." Id.
155. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of WiUingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), where
the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance that prohibited on-site residential "For Sale"
and "Sold" signs. Id. at 97. The municipality had prohibited posting such signs because it
feared that posting these signs would cause "white flight" from a racially integrated community. Id. at 86.
156. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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that a state disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyers from advertising
prices was unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court stated that
some regulation of commercial advertising by attorneys was permissible but that total prohibition, especially in the printed media,
was not. 15 7 The Court also said that special consideration had to be
given to the regulation of advertising when it related to illegal activities and appeared on electronic broadcast media.1 58
Later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,15 9 the Court invalidated a ban on all public utility advertising which promoted the use of electricity. 160 A four-part test
was applied, which the Court described as follows:
At the outset we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.'61

The workings of this test were demonstrated in Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego,162 where the Court held that a city's general ban on billboards was invalid on its face because it prohibited
noncommercial speech as well as commercial speech." 3 The Court
concluded that the city did not have the right to limit the locations
of billboards based upon their noncommercial speech content.'"
The Court recognized, however, that the city ordinance would have
been valid to the extent it applied only to commercial speech.1 65
Finally, in Matter of R.M.J., 6 the Supreme Court held that
commercial speech falls into one of three categories: (1) inherently
misleading or proven to be misleading, which the state may absolutely prohibit; (2) potentially misleading, for which the state may
require a disclamatory explanation; or (3) not misleading, for
which regulation must be justified by a substantial state interest.'6 7
157. Id. at 384.
158.
159.

Id.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).

160. Id. at 571.
161. Id. at 566.
162.

453 U.S. 490 (1981).

163. Id. at 521.
164. Id. at 515.
165. Id. at 512.
166.

455 U.S. 191 (1982).

167. Id. at 203.
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In the last category, the Court concluded that only carefully
drafted restrictions were appropriate so far as they were reasonably necessary to further the substantial interest of the state. 16s
In Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Schaffer,6 9
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that an attorney's advertisement offering legal services for adoption proceedings was within
the realm of constitutionally protected commercial speech. 17 0 The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma relied upon Bates v. State Bar of Arizona to determine that the state's power to restrain lawyer advertising was limited to that which was false, deceptive, misleading or
which proposed an illegal transaction.'M The court also applied the
more recent standard from Matter of R.M.J. to hold that the advertisements in question were neither misleading nor potentially
deceptive and that no substantial state interest was posed to jus2
tify complete prohibition of lawyer advertising.1
In Adoption Hot Line, Inc. v. State,'73 the District Court of Appeals of Florida held that a permanent injunction against all advertising by an unlicensed adoption placement referral service was
too broad and therefore was an impermissible violation of the first
amendment freedom of speech.17 In a short opinion, the court
stated that the total prohibition of all advertising had the effect of
preventing even that advertising which applied to legitimate referral services.1 75 Without a showing by the state that a narrower restriction would be insufficient to protect the government's interest
or that the advertising itself was misleading, the court concluded
that a complete prohibition was unconstitutional.7 6 The court
characterized the advertising in Adoption Hot Line as commercial
77
speech.
168. Id. (footnote omitted). As the Court stated, "the State must assert a substantial
interest and interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest served. . . . Restrictions must be narrowly drawn, and the State lawfully may regulate only to the extent
regulation furthers the State's substantial interest." Id.
169. 648 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1982).
170. 648 P.2d at 359.
171. 648 P.2d at 357.
172. Id.
173. 402 So.2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
174. Id. at 1308-09.
175. Id. at 1308.
176. Id. at 1308-09.
177. Id. at 1309. The court cited several recent Supreme Court cases which dealt with
commercial speech: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)(ordinance
against all commercial signs was too broad); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)(commercial speech not misleading); Linmark
Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)(commercial speech may be reg-

1986

Adoption Advertising

Basically, in Adoption Hot Line the state sought an injunction
against a couple who acted as a referral and counsel service for
pregnant women by providing them with the names of doctors and
lawyers who could thereupon act as intermediaries. 178 The Florida
statutory scheme at that time, which is still in force today, permitted licensed physicians and lawyers to act as intermediaries in
adoption placements. 179 However, the statutory scheme did not expressly prohibit advertising for adoption placements, but did protect against improper and unsuitable placements of children. 80
The court in Adoption Hot Line held that a complete injunction
against advertising to protect against effects based only on
probability was overbroad.' 8 '
Apparently, in response to the Adoption Hot Line case, the Florida statute was revised in 1984 to include an express prohibition
against any type of advertising by anyone except the state government, a licensed agency or an intermediary. 82 The effect of this
amendment was to prohibit private parties from advertising for
adoption placement, while allowing such activities on the part of
attorneys and physicians.' 8 3
Perhaps the most limiting statute proscribing advertising for
adoption placement is that of Georgia. That statute goes so far as
to outlaw oral statements that a person will adopt a child.' 8 Further, such conduct is treated as a felony with accompanying criminal penalties. 8 5 However, the statute would seem to permit a priulated as to time, place and manner); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)(protected commercial speech includes the advertising of drug prices).
178. See Adoption Hot Line, Inc. v. State, 358 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Ap.
1980).
179. See FLA. STAT. § 63.032(8) (West 1979).
180. See 385 So. 2d at 648 n.3, citing § 63.092, Fla. Stat. (1979).
181. 402 So. 2d at 1308.
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(h)(West 1985).

183. See

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 63.032(8)(West 1985).

184. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19(a)(1982) states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, organization, corporation, hospital, or association of any kind whatsoever which has not been established as a licensed child-placing agency by the Department of Human Resources to advertise, whether in a periodical, by television, by radio, or by any other public medium or by any private means,
including letters, circulars, handbills, and oral statements, that the person, organization, corporation, hospital or association, will adopt children or will arrange for or
cause children to be adopted or placed for adoption.
185. GA. CODE ANN. §19-8-19(c)(1982) states the penalty for violation of § 19-8-19(a),
supra note 198, as follows: "Any person who violates subsection (a) or (b) of this Code
section shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine
not to exceed $10,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both, in the discre-
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vate party to receive a child directly from the natural parent for
the purpose of adoption.' 8 6 It strains logical reasoning to imagine
that such an extreme prohibition of noncommercial speech could
withstand a challenge under the constitutional standard reflected
in Metromedia.187 There is, however, no evidence that this statute
has been attacked on a constitutional basis.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has not yet articulated clear definitions of
commercial and noncommercial speech. 18 8 The distinction becomes
crucial, however, if it is determined that it is constitutionally permissible to prohibit advertising for the sale of legal commercial
products. 89 Even if advertising for adoption placement is considered to fall within the realm of commercial speech, first amendment protection has been extended to such advertising in the
printed media, 1'9 0 mails,' 9 ' and on billboards. 92 Such methods of
adoption advertising are usually proscribed by the statutes discussed herein.
The modern trend among state statutory adoption schemes is to
allow private placements but to control them through limitations
on compensation and requirements for court ordered investigation
of the placement. This trend is further evidenced in uniform statutes and can be effective without placing undue restrictions on advertising. Ideally, all states should seek uniformity in their procedures for and limitations of the adoption process, to reduce the
tion of the court."
186. See GA. CODE ANN. §19-8-3(a)(3) (1982).
187. See supra notes 162 to 165 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Central Hudson, note 159, at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also
Comment, Jury Award Advertising - PoliticalSpeech or Commercial Speech?, 15 CONN. L.
REV. 273 (1983).
189. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct.
2968 (1986) (advertisement of legal casino gambling could be limited to only public media
which originated outside of Puerto Rico, without infringing on first amendment protection
of commercial speech). See generally Thain, Prohibitionson Advertising for Products It is
Legal to Sell: A Constitutionally Valid Option, 3 J. PROD. L. 83 (1984), which considers the
popular restrictions on the advertisement of liquor and cigarettes. See also Recent Development, Tension Between the First and Twenty-First Amendments in State Regulation of
Alcohol Advertising, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (1984). But see Note, Chicken Ranch Cries Foul:
Limitations on Commercial Expression - Why Can't Legal Prostitutes Advertise?, 4 DET.
C.L. REV. 1613 (1983).
190. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)(newspaper).
191. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 577 (1980) (leaflets included with mailed utility

bills).
192.

See Metromedia, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)(on-site commercial billboards).
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advantage of avoiding particular limitations by arranging interstate adoption placements.
Since courts must finalize adoptions in all states, denial of the
adoption petition is the most effective sanction against parties who
might attempt to evade the statutory restrictions. Courts should
also reserve criminal penalties to punish the recipients of profits
from unlawful placements rather than to destroy the family ties of
parents and adoptive children who have submitted to excessive fee
payments.
Advertising for adoption placements is an activity that is easily
monitored by law enforcement agencies. Additionally, advertising
can discourage those black market baby brokers who seek to profit
from adoption placements by encouraging direct contact between
adoptive parents and natural parents, without the need for an intermediary. Advertising as a method of arranging placements can
also be used to maintain anonymity between the natural parents
and the adoptive parents.
Outright prohibition of advertising for adoption placement is
overbroad as well as inconsistent with the statutory schemes of
those states which permit private placement. If advertising for
adoption placements is to be regulated at all, restrictions on it
should be limited to messages which advertise clearly unlawful
profiteering practices. An alternative method of regulating advertisements would be to require prior court approval for such activities. However, such a system would overburden the courts and may
be redundant if the court must review the placement again during
the adoption proceeding. Constitutional protections of noncommercial speech are crucial to adoption advertising, and broad
prohibitions against advertising are inconsistent with those
principles.
David F. Tegeler

